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Abstract 
This study demonstrates that the European Commission contribute to weaken hierarchical 
decision-making processes, and ultimately politico-administrative control and oversight, 
within the Norwegian central administration. This article studies how the Norwegian central 
administrative apparatus is penetrated by the European Commission through ten years of 
“associated EU membership” through the EEA agreement. The study outlines two 
complementary theoretical approaches to account for actual decision-making processes within 
domestic central administrations: one ‘administrative integration approach’ claiming that 
different EU institutions have profound and differentiated impact on domestic hierarchical 
governance, and one ‘administrative robustness approach’ advocating that the “EU effect” is 
filtered, mediated and modified through existing domestic decision-making routines and 
practices. The empirical analysis, based on a comprehensive body of survey, interview and 
documentation data from 2005, indicates that the European Commission tend do strengthen 
the lower echelons of the Norwegian government hierarchy, notably sector experts within 
sector agencies and sector ministries. At the same time, the European Commission tend to 
weaken the Norwegian politico-administrative leadership, the Foreign Office and the Prime 
Ministers Office. Consequently, the Norwegian case reveals that processes of mutual 
interpenetration between the European Commission and domestic government occur largely 
outside the control of the Norwegian politico-administrative leadership. Finally, this study 
also highlights that the Norwegian central administration mediates, filter and modify, to some 
extent, decision impulses from the European Commission. 
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Introduction1 
Ten years ago referendums were held almost simultaneously in Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Austria on the question of EU membership. In Norway 52,2 percent voted in favour of 
rejecting a EU membership, while 57 percent of the Finish voters, 66,6 percent of the 
Austrian voters, and 52 percent of the Swedish voters favoured a EU membership (Höll, 
Pollack & Puntscher-Riekmann 2003, 338; Tiilikainen 2003, 150). This study demonstrates 
that the European Commission has contributed to weakening hierarchical decision-making 
processes, and ultimately politico-administrative control and oversight, within the Norwegian 
central administration. This article studies how the Norwegian central administrative 
apparatus is penetrated by the European Commission through ten years of “associated EU 
membership” through the EEA agreement. The empirical analysis, based on a comprehensive 
body of survey, interview and documentation data from 2005, indicates that the European 
Commission tend do strengthen the lower echelons of the Norwegian government hierarchy, 
notably sector experts within sector agencies and sector ministries. At the same time, the 
European Commission tend to weaken the Norwegian politico-administrative leadership, the 
Foreign Office (FO) and the Prime Ministers Office (PMO). 
 
The wave of public management reforms has marked a tendency towards stronger vertical 
specialisation of administrative units through devolution of semi-autonomous agencies in 
Norway (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). A classical tension has prevailed in Norway 
between ministerial governance and agency autonomy. This conflict has centred on two 
dimensions: that between vertical politico-administrative control versus professional 
neutrality, and that between horizontal co-ordination versus sectoral departmentalisation 
(Jacobsen 1960). The argument presented by this study is that the European Commission 
tends to strengthen dynamics of professional neutrality and sectoral departmentalisation 
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within domestic government systems. The Norwegian government system applies ministerial 
rule and administrative monism accompanying a closer formal relationship between the 
minister, his cabinet and subordinated agencies (Lægreid & Pedersen 1999). In this system, 
“the ministers are always accountable for the actions of a directorate” (Jacobsson, Lægreid & 
Pedersen 2004, 6). Still, this study demonstrates that the European Commission tend to 
weaken the hierarchical control vested in the politico-administrative leadership of the Cabinet, 
PMO and FO. Whereas the territorial principle of specialisation within the Council of 
Ministers arguably strengthens the domestic politico-administrative leadership, the sectoral 
principle of specialisation within the European Commission tends to weaken that same 
leadership. 
 
The dependent variable of this study is the actual decision-making processes unfolding within 
the Norwegian central administration generally, particularly the degrees of hierarchical 
decision-making processes therein. The empirical yardstick of hierarchical decision-making is 
the extent to which the politico-administrative leadership ultimately controls the decision-
making processes that unfold within domestic government institutions. Hierarchical decision-
making denotes that “the most important policy decisions [are] taken at the apex of a 
government organisation … and those lower down in the hierarchy merely … carry them out” 
(Page 1992, 61). De-hierarchisation refers to the fact that important decisions are crafted 
autonomously by civil servants in the lower echelons of the government hierarchy. Decision-
making behaviour refers to the contacts, co-ordination patterns and priorities made by civil 
servants. A de-hierarchisation of decision-making behaviour thus denotes civil servants 
having few contacts with the politico-administrative leadership, receiving few priorities from 
this leadership, and/or co-ordinate more among fellow peers horizontally than with the 
leadership vertically. One indicator thereof is that EU/EEA dossiers are handled by domestic 
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sector experts within sector agencies and ministries and less by the politico-administrative 
leadership of the FO and the PMO.2 
 
Whereas the Swedish EU membership has integrated the Swedish administrative apparatus 
into both the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, the Norwegian associated 
membership (through the EEA agreement) has (partly) integrated the Norwegian government 
fabric solely to the Commission system. Empirically, the case of Norway demonstrates how 
the European Commission administrative system contributes to informally circumvent the 
Norwegian decision-making hierarchy and thus weaken politico-administrative control and 
oversight by the politico-administrative elites at the PMO and the PO. Moreover, the 
Norwegian case also demonstrates that ten years of associated membership in the EU have not 
fundamentally transformed decision-making processes within the Norwegian central 
administration. This study reveals that trends towards a de-hierarchisation of government 
decision-making processes are filtered, edited and translated through domestic administrative 
routines and practices.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. The next section presents two supplementary theoretical 
approaches to account for how EU institutions impact on hierarchical governance within 
domestic central administrations. The first approach presented is an ‘administrative 
integration approach’ claiming that different EU institutions have profound and differentiated 
impact on hierarchical governance within domestic central administrations. The second 
approach is an ‘administrative robustness approach’ advocating that hierarchical governance 
within domestic central administrations adapt less effectively and accurately towards EU 
institutions than claimed by the first approach. The second section provides an empirical 
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analysis on how ten years of EEA-affiliation have impacted on degrees of hierarchical 
decision-making processes within the Norwegian central administrative apparatus.  
 
THEORISING DIFFERENTIATED DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
This section outlines two supplementary theoretical approaches that render understandable 
how different EU institutions impact differently on degrees of hierarchical decision-making 
processes. First, one ‘administrative integration approach’ is presented claiming that different 
EU institutions accompany different levels of hierarchical decision-making within domestic 
government systems. Secondly, one ‘administrative robustness approach’ is outlined arguing 
that the “EU effect” is mediated and filtered through domestic decision-making routines and 
practices.  
 
An administrative integration approach 
This approach builds on a generic organisation theory perspective, not on sui generis theories 
of administrative fusion as suggested by Wolfgang Wessels (1998). One advantage of 
applying a general or ‘cosmopolitan’ approach like organisation theory is the possibilities of 
drawing general inferences from single-case studies (Kohler-Koch 2003, 7). An organisation 
theory perspective assumes that civil servants employed in government institutions are 
bounded rational faced with information overload, computational limitations and a complex 
web of roles to play. The role as a civil servant is ambiguous with a multifaceted and complex 
set of role-expectations embedded. The vertical and horizontal specialisation of public 
administration serves to systematically buffer the information and role expectations relevant 
for each civil servant, thereby simplifying their preference formation and ultimately choice of 
decision-making behaviour (Egeberg 1999; Thelen and Steimno 1992). The local rationality 
of civil servants is systematically aggregated by this buffer function into organisational 
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rationality (Gulick 1937; Simon 1957). Consequently, the organisational selection of relevant 
information, premises for decision making and role enactment affects how civil servants 
think, feel and act.  
 
Organisational dynamics are triggered when organisational borders are criss-crossed in day-
to-day decision-making (Egeberg 1999). Arguably, the organisational borders between 
domestic administrative systems and the EU institutions are increasingly by-passed and 
weakened (Kohler-Koch 2003). The EU institutions and domestic government apparatuses 
interact in day-to-day policy-making through a complex web of EU committees, the system of 
seconded civil servants, through embassies, as well as informal networks of civil servants 
(Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003; Lewis 2000; Trondal 2004a; Van Schendelen and 
Scully 2003). Assumable, civil service systems that frequently interact tend to become 
increasingly similar in organisational terms, with respect to the decision-making processes 
unfolding, as well as the public policy crafted (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Wessels 1998). 
Assuming that formal organisations focus the attention of bounded rational actors, national 
government systems with intimate contact towards EU institutions are likely to become 
systematically affected as regards their decision-making practices.  
 
According to the classical administration school of Luther Gulick (1937), organisations may 
be horizontally specialised according to four principles: purpose, process, territory and 
clientele. The horizontal principles of purpose and process are observed in most domestic 
sector ministries and agencies, in the European Commission DGs, in the subordinated 
agencies of the Commission as well as in the web of Commission expert committees (Egeberg 
and Trondal 1999; Peters 1995, 147). Arguably, civil servants who frequently interact within 
administrative systems organised by purpose and process are assumed to evoke decision-
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making behaviour that reflects their sectoral portfolios and professional skills, respectively. 
These civil servants are likely to perceive themselves as Weberian civil servants abiding rules 
and established practices within their portfolios as well as independent and neutral experts, 
respectively (Weber 1964). These officials are less likely to act on fixed mandates issued by 
the politico-administrative leadership or to negotiate within the Council of Ministers on the 
basis of fixed national mandates written by the domestic FO and PMO. The latter behavioural 
pattern is arguably activated within territorially specialised organisations, such as domestic 
FOs and the Council of Ministers (see below). 
 
According to this line of argumentation, the decision-making behaviour evoked by civil 
servants is contingent on the organisational properties of the administrative systems in which 
they are embedded. Henceforth, different EU institutions – notably the European Commission 
and the Council of Ministers – are likely to condition domestic decision-making processes 
differently. Whereas the European Commission is likely to foster a horizontal sector-
fragmentation of domestic decision-making processes and a weakening of domestic politico-
administrative leadership, the Council of Ministers is likely to accompany domestic horizontal 
coherence across policy sectors and a demand for strengthening of domestic politico-
administrative leadership (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Whereas the Swedish EU membership 
has integrated the Swedish administrative apparatus into both the European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers, the Norwegian associated membership (through the EEA 
agreement) has (partly) integrated the Norwegian government fabric solely to the Commission 
system.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates that intimate interaction between domestic sector ministries and the 
European Commission may contribute to turn the domestic pyramidal hierarchy of 
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governance upside-down. Assumable, the European Commission activates the lower echelons 
of the domestic government hierarchies, notably sector experts within sector agencies and 
sector ministries. Arguably, the European Commission de-activates the domestic politico-
administrative leadership, the FO and the PMO. 
 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
 
According to Luther Gulick (1937) organisations may be organised to accommodate territorial 
interests and concerns. Domestically, local prefect offices as well as FOs are examples of 
territorially organised government bodies. The FO has the task of diplomatic representation 
abroad and to integrate national preferences that cross-cuts the portfolio of sector ministries. 
Traditionally the FO has been organised outside the domain of ‘domestic’ politics and outside 
the institutional turf-wars between sector ministries and the Finance Ministry (Christensen 
1996). By this specialised organisational solution issues pertaining to other states as well as to 
international organisations are supposed to be co-ordinated by the FO. At the EU level the 
best example of territorial organisation is found within the Council of Ministers, particularly 
at the Minister level and the COREPER – including the Antici and Mertens groups (Egeberg 
and Trondal 1999; Sherrington 2000). Examples of organisation by purpose and process, 
however, are also present within the Council, notably at the level of working groups and 
within the Council Secretariat (Christiansen 2001). However, national civil servants 
participating in Council working groups are expected to represent their governments and 
speak with “one voice” (Beyers and Trondal 2004; Larsson 2003, 164).  
 
Arguably, the Council of Ministers is likely to activate territorially organised domestic 
ministries like domestic FOs and PMOs, with horizontally co-ordinating roles within the 
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Government. Moreover, the cross-sect oral co-ordination portfolios of these ministries 
contribute to a domestic filtering of the sectoral dynamics that may penetrate from the 
European Commission (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). The Swedish EU membership allows 
Swedish civil servants to participate in the Council of Ministers whereas the EEA agreement 
excludes Norwegian civil servants from attending Council meetings. Accordingly, we expect 
to observe that EU/EEA decision-making processes within the Norwegian central 
administration are poorly co-ordinated cross-sectorally by the FO and the PMO. Hence, the 
Norwegian FO is less likely to be strengthened by the European Commission because 
‘national positions’ (of FOs) have weak access opportunities within the Commission 
apparatus. Consequently, the Norwegian civil service is likely to be strongly penetrated by the 
sector-dynamics of the European Commission and experience a decline of the powers of the 
FO, PMO and the politico-administrative leadership (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 2 illustrates how intimate interaction between domestic ministries (and agencies) and 
the Council of Ministers may contribute to uphold the domestic pyramidal hierarchy of 
governance.  
 
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
 
An administrative robustness approach 
Bureaucratic organisations tend to develop added value “beyond the technical requirements of 
the task at hand” (Selznick 1957, 17). Processes of infusion ultimately contribute to give the 
organisation an embodiment of purpose that provides a conservative institutional logic 
preserving existing decision-making processes (Sryker and Strathan 1985). Processes of 
infusion create a unique culture, identity, or soul to organisations, promoting resistance 
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against abrupt change patterns (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The administrative robustness 
approach claims that institutionalised organisations are fairly robust against ‘big bang’ 
changes in administrative structures, routines and decision-making processes (March and 
Olsen 1989). Accordingly, intimate interaction between the European Commission and 
domestic government institutions on the other are not likely to radically transform domestic 
decision-making processes. The impact stemming from the European Commission is likely to 
be filtered, edited and translated through existing domestic decision-making routines and 
practices (Olsen 2003b). Whereas the ’administrative integration approach’ is based on an 
underlying assumption of bounded rationality, the administrative robustness approach is based 
on assumptions going beyond the logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen 1989). The 
central logic is that of human beings as collections of identities, roles, cognition, emotions and 
senses of belongingness, and that decision-making behaviour is guided by processes of 
matching these properties to particular situations (March and Olsen 1989). A central 
underlying assumption is that civil servants’ decision-making behaviour is a product of such 
matching-processes. The choice of decision-making behaviour is ultimately determined by 
perceptions of self, perceptions of relevant situation as well as perceptions of how these 
properties should be linked appropriately (March and Olsen 1989).  
 
Organisational boundaries are more than cognitive buffers to the attention of decision-makers. 
Organisational boundaries are normative, ethical, symbolic and temporal orders (Egeberg 
1994, 85). They grow, blossom and die through long “historical processes of interpretation, 
learning and habituation” (Olsen 1995, 28). Drawing and redrawing organisational 
borderlines not only affect decision-making behaviour on the basis of cognitive search-
processes, but also on the basis of matching identities and role perceptions to particular 
situations (Brunsson and Olsen 1997). Parallel to the ‘hermeneutic circle’, path-dependencies 
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implies that future changes of decision-making processes are conditioned by past and present 
decision-making practices (Adler 1997, 321). One impact of this argument is that 
archaeological layers of decision-making routines and practices are stored within government 
institutions. Accordingly, it becomes easier to adopt new decision-making practices than to 
remove old ones due to the added value attached to existing practices (March and Olsen 
1989). It also becomes easier to reorganise the balance between pre-existing behavioural 
practices than to add new practices or to subtract old ones. With March’ words: “An 
individual who has been negotiating a tough contract as an antagonistic lawyer carries that 
identity over to the role of diner in a restaurant or driver on a highway” (March 1994, 70). In 
the EU-context, national officials who have just arrived at the EU meeting are likely to re-
activate pre-established decision-making behaviour, preferences and roles of a domestic 
origin. 
 
Data and method 
This study benefits from a multitude of data streams. The primary data is provided by a 
comprehensive study by the Audit General of Norway (2005) on the EU/EEA decision-
making processes within the Norwegian central administration. First, this data set includes 
interview data with key informants in selected Norwegian ministries as well as at the 
Norwegian Delegation to the European Union. Secondly, this data set covers a survey study 
among all Norwegian ministries3 and relevant subordinated agencies (N = 510). The response 
rate in this survey is 80 percent. Finally, the data set consists of official and unofficial 
documents from the Norwegian FO, the Ministry of Environment (ME), the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (MTI) and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) (Audit General of 
Norway 2005, 10). Among the documents covered are 535 dossiers and 356 ‘problem-notes’ 
from the issue specific co-ordination committees of ME, MTI and MPE. This collection of 
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data was collected from October 2003 to January 2005. Additional data are provided by a 
large-scale survey study among Norwegian civil servants in 1996 (N = 1479 at the ministerial 
level and N = 1024 at the agency level), and a survey among Norwegian civil servants 
attending Commission expert committees (N = 116). The empirical analysis of this article 
thus combines a rich body of empirical data on the decision-making processes within the 
Norwegian central administration. Together these data give an extensive empirical picture of 
the EU/EEA decision-making processes within the Norwegian central administration.  
 
The Norwegian Central Administration Ten years after Accession 
The government of Norway applies ministerial rule and administrative monism accompanying 
a close formalised relationship between minister, his Cabinet, and subordinated agencies 
(Lægreid & Pedersen 1999). There is currently 17 Norwegian ministries employing 
approximately 4000 civil servants. The Norwegian FO is by far the largest with 659 officials 
(St.prp. nr. 1 (2004-2005)). According to the White paper St.prp. nr. 100 (1991-1992) this 
existing government structure is intended to co-ordinate the EU/EEA decision-making 
processes within the Norwegian central administration.  
 
Norway has been pictured as an adaptive non-member of the EU (Sverdrup 1998). In the 
period 1997 to 2003 Norway adopted 2.129 (18,5 per cent) of the 11.511 new regulations 
decided by the EU (Nationen 2004). In sum, Norway has adopted 4.600 EU regulations in the 
period 1994 to 2004 (Dagbladet 2004). These observations indicate that Norwegian public 
policy has adapted flexibly towards new EU regulations (Claes & Tranøy 1999). However, 
studies show little evidence of a large-scale re-organisation of the Norwegian central 
administrative system due to the EU (Jacobssen, Lægreid & Pedersen 2004). Our focus, 
however, is neither on policy adaptation nor on re-organisation of the formal administrative 
 CES – Working paper no. 4, 2005                                                    15 
apparatus but on the actual decision-making processes unfolding within the Norwegian central 
administrative apparatus have adjusted to ten years of “associate membership” in the EU. 
 
The Norwegian case shows evidence of a de-hierarchisation of the decision-making processes 
in the central administrative apparatus. A comprehensive study of the decision-making 
processes within the Norwegian central administration in 1996 showed that approximately 50 
per cent of the civil servants were affected by the EU and/or the EEA agreement. 22 per cent 
of the sector ministry officials and 13 per cent of the agency officials reported having attended 
Commission expert committees. Only very few officials had experiences from the comitology 
committees (Egeberg & Trondal 1999). Moreover, the Norwegian central administration, with 
the exception of the FO, had witnessed a remarkable stabile level of participation in the 
Commission expert committees from 1994 to 1999: 252 committees in 1994, 200 committees 
in 1995, 207 committees in 1996, 211 committees in 1997, and 200 committees in 1999 
(Egeberg & Trondal 1999, 138; Statskonsult 2001:15). At present a minority of top 
Norwegian civil servants belong to the core segment of very active EU committee participants 
(Jacobsson, Lægreid & Pedersen 2004, 51). Norwegian officials attending Commission expert 
committees are mostly from the agency level and the majority is employed in lower rank 
positions. They are typically professional experts with fairly loose ties towards the politico-
administrative leadership (Statskonsult 1999:6, 27). Yet, when attending Commission expert 
committees these officials tend to perceive their role as that of a national representative in 
addition to the role as independent expert and a supranational agent (Trondal 2004b). Notably, 
Norwegian government officials attending the Commission expert committees attend with 
ambiguous mandates. They generally receive few clear instructions and signals from the 
politico-administrative leadership (Statskonsult 1999:6, 44). According to one Norwegian 
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civil servant, “the EEA work does not get the necessary daily attention from the top 
management” (Statskonsult 2002:5, 19 – authors’ translation). 
 
Few Norwegian government officials are accustomed to a written procedure for co-ordinating 
EU/EEA dossiers, and actual co-ordination is mostly done informally and post hoc to the EU 
committee meetings, marginally involving the politico-administrative leadership (Jacobsson, 
Lægreid & Pedersen 2004, 39; Sætereng 2001). Despite Norwegian officials are obliged to 
prepare written co-ordination documents (‘problem-notes’) in the pre-pipeline agenda setting 
phase of the European Commission, this is seldom done in practice (see Table 2 beneath). 
Illustrative, the Norwegian FO does not have any written strategies for how EU/EEA dossiers 
should be administrated within the Norwegian central administration (Audit General of 
Norway 2005, 22). The Norwegian central administration tends to be more adequately co-
ordinated intra-ministerially than inter-ministerially when approaching the European 
Commission. Moreover, these co-ordination processes are less formalised and routinised than 
intended by the Norwegian PMO and FO (Audit General of Norway 2005, 33). More 
generally, the formal co-ordination apparatus for EU/EEA dossiers is activated less frequently 
than officially intended by the Norwegian PMO (Audit General of Norway 2005; St.prp. nr. 
100 (1991-1992). As seen in Table 1 (below) this co-ordination apparatus is more active post 
hoc in the Commission agenda setting phase than ex ante in the agenda setting phase of the 
Commission expert committee meetings (Statskonsult 1999:6 and 2002:5, 37). However, 
ministries heavily affected by EU dossiers and strongly involved in EU committee meetings 
seem to have better co-ordination capacities than those ministries less involved in EU affairs 
(Statskonsult 2001:15, 15). Finally, the ministry-level seems better co-ordinated than the 
agency-level, and officials in top rank positions (typically heads of unit) are more adequately 
mandated than officials in lower rank positions (Statskonsult 2001:15, 16; Trondal 2004b).  
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Table 1 shows in which phase of the EU decision-making cycle the Norwegian issue specific 
co-ordination committees are activated – in the pre-pipeline preparation phase, in the 
decision-shaping phase, or in the decision-making phase. Table 1 refers to the experiences 
within the Norwegian Ministry of Environment (ME), the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI) and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE). The Table is empirically based on 
in-depth analyses of 535 dossiers handled by the issue specific co-ordination committees of 
ME, MTI and MPE. 
 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
 
 Table 1 clearly testifies that the Norwegian inter-ministerial co-ordination apparatus is 
mainly operating after the preparation phase within the European Commission. 89 per cent of 
the EU regulations dealt with by these co-ordination committees are situated in the decision-
shaping and decision-making phase within the EU apparatus. Hence, Table 1 shows clearly 
that EU/EEA co-ordination processes within the Norwegian central administration are 
directed towards the agenda setting processes within the European Commission. Moreover, 
minutes from these issue specific co-ordination committees reveals that these committees 
seldom discuss how Norwegian interests should be “uploaded” to the Commission decision-
making process (Audit General of Norway 2005, 29).  
 
Co-ordination of EU dossiers within the Norwegian central administration is intended to be 
based on written documentation (so called ‘problem-notes’), written by the issue specific co-
ordination committees. Table 2 demonstrates in which phase of the EU decision-making cycle 
these problem-notes are actually written – in the pre-pipeline preparation phase, in the 
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decision-shaping phase, or in the decision-making phase. Table 2 refers to the experiences of 
the ME, MTI and MPE. Table 2 is empirically based on in-depth analyses of 356 ‘problem-
notes’ handled by the issue specific co-ordination committees of ME, MTI and MPE. 
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
Table 2 clearly shows that inter-ministerial co-ordination through a written procedure, like the 
problem-note system, is rarely used in the Norwegian central administration in order to 
influence the preparation phase within the European Commission. Whereas 5 percent of the 
problem-notes are written at the preparation phase in the Commission, 90 percent of the 
problem-notes are written after the Commission has finished this phase, and where the 
Norwegian central administration have formal rights of access (EEA agreement Art. 99 to 
101).  
 
Trondal & Veggeland (2003) show that Norwegian and Swedish officials attending the 
Commission expert committees evoke fairly similar roles – national, functional and 
supranational roles, respectively (ordered by importance). The Commission expert 
committees, however, have a stronger functional dynamic than both the Council working 
groups and the comitology committees, accompanying lower levels of inter-sectoral co-
ordination among participants to the Commission expert committees than among Council 
working group and comitology committee participants (Egeberg, Schaefer & Trondal 2003). 
Moreover, during the so-called ‘interim period’ for Norway in 1994, when Norway prepared 
for EU membership, Norwegian civil servants where entitled to attend the Council working 
groups. Trondal (1999) shows that this period was market by a profound increase of inter-
ministerial co-ordination and a substantial co-ordinating role for the Norwegian FO vis-à-vis 
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Council working groups and COREPER. As a result of the Norwegian referendum in 
November 2004 Norway lost the right to attend the Council system. One notable impact was 
that the degree of FO-lead inter-ministerial co-ordination decreased markedly in the spring 
1995, and that the co-ordinating role of the Norwegian FO diminished relative to the co-
ordinating role of sector ministries and agencies (Christensen 1996; Trondal 1999).4 At 
present the responsibility for co-ordination of EU dossiers within the Norwegian central 
administration is pictured as ambiguous and with “hands-off” politico-administrative 
leadership (Audit General of Norway 2005, 55). 
 
The declining role of the Norwegian FO vis-à-vis the sector ministries is a long trend in all 
EU member-states (Wessels, Maurer & Mittag 2003). In Norway East (1984, 127) reported 
early that officials in the Norwegian FO tended to be more concerned with intra-ministerial 
co-ordination than inter-ministerial co-ordination, and that the Norwegian FO was more 
effective on inter-ministerial co-ordination on bilateral issues that transcend Europe. By 
contrast, the international activities of Norwegian agencies’ are more narrowly oriented 
towards the European hemisphere (Underdal 1987, 182). Hence, the European Commission 
seems to accelerate an already ongoing weakening of the Norwegian FO (Christensen 1996). 
EU dossiers handled by the Commission are highly technical, requiring specialised 
knowledge to disentangle and influence successfully. As typical generalists in foreign affairs 
and diplomatic encounters, most Norwegian FO officials lack the professional capabilities 
available to sector-experts in the sector ministries and agencies to substantially and 
instrumentally handle EU dossiers (Claes 2003, 92; Kassim, Peters & Wright 2000, 239). For 
example, relatively few officials from the Norwegian FO attend Commission committee 
meetings (Egeberg & Trondal 1999, 138). Officials at the Norwegian Delegation to the EU 
have more direct and intimate contacts with Norwegian sector ministries than preferred by the 
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Norwegian FO (Statskonsult 2002:5, 18). These observations support the picture of the 
Norwegian FO as that of a “post-box” between the Norwegian sector ministries and agencies 
and the European Commission (Trondal 1999).  
 
The Norwegian Parliamentary EEA committee convene few meetings, handle few EU 
dossiers substantively, and have weak administrative resources to control the Norwegian 
central administration on EU dossiers (Melsæther & Sverdrup 2004; Sørensen 2004). The 
Norwegian Parliamentary EEA committee may not issue binding mandates on the 
Government on EEA dossiers as may for example the Danish Parliamentary EU committee 
(Larsson & Trondal 2005). Notably, some Norwegian political parties have better access to 
the European Parliament through their European party federations than the Norwegian 
Parliament as an institution (Nordby & Veggeland 1999, 89; Statskonsult 2002:5).  
 
“[G]overnments deal with European affairs much as they manage domestic affairs” (Engel 
2003, 245). The Norwegian central administration is no exception. The Norwegian central 
administration seems more sectorally de-coupled, de-politicised and fragmented than 
territorially integrated, politicised and co-ordinated when handling EU dossiers. With respect 
to how the Norwegian central administration handles EU/EEA dossiers, it is pictured as 
reactive, de-politicised and horizontally fragmented (Jacobsson, Lægreid & Pedersen 2004), 
even vertically disintegrated “whereby ‘micro-decisions’ tend to be de-coupled from the 
overall policy purpose and strategy” (Underdal 1987, 170). EU dossiers are largely integrated 
into the day-to-day decision-making routines of Norwegian sector ministries, agencies, 
divisions and units (Egeberg & Trondal 1997, 342). Hence, the Norwegian central 
administration displays more horizontal fragmentation than co-ordination between ministries, 
and more horizontal fragmentation between ministries than within them. The Norwegian case 
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indicates that ten years of intimate relationship between national sector ministries and the 
European Commission has strengthened trends towards horizontal inter-ministerial 
fragmentation. Secondly, ten years of interaction between Norwegian sector ministries and the 
European Commission has accompanied a weakening of hierarchical decision-making 
processes within the Norwegian central government apparatus (cf. Figure 1).  
 
Conclusions 
This study demonstrates that intimate relationships between the Norwegian central 
administration and the European Commission have accompanied profound impacts on the 
day-to-day decision-making processes unfolding within the Norwegian central administration. 
The study reveals that the Norwegian central administration is strongly sector-penetrated by 
the European Commission accompanying a de-hierarchisation of the actual decision-making 
processes unfolding within the Norwegian central administration (Figure 1). The European 
Commission fosters a rift between Government responsibility and Government control over 
the decision-making processes crafted by the government officials. These observations 
support the ‘administrative integration approach’ as suggested in this study. The European 
Commission tends to activate the lower echelons of the Norwegian government hierarchy, 
notably sector experts within sector agencies and sector ministries. The European 
Commission fosters a de-activation of the Norwegian politico-administrative leadership, the 
PO and the PMO. Henceforth, the empirical observations presented demonstrate that EU/EEA 
decision-making processes within the Norwegian government system are strongly conditioned 
by the Commission structure, as indicated in Figure 1.  
 
In support of the ‘administrative robustness approach’ this study reveals that the impact of the 
European Commission is received differentially within different parts of the Norwegian 
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central administration. The European Commission seems to contribute to a de-hierarchisation 
of the decision-making processes both within sector ministries and agencies, notably at the 
level of advisors and senior advisors. However we see a stronger de-hierachisation of 
decision-making processes at the agency-level than at the ministry-level. Ministry officials 
attending Commission expert committees tend to be more strongly co-ordinated from the 
politico-administrative leadership than agency officials attending Commission expert 
committees; and officials from the Norwegian PO tend to be more strongly mandated than 
officials from Norwegian sector ministries. Hence, this study highlights how domestic 
government institutions mediate and filter the impact of supranational executive institutions 
like the European Commission. EU dossiers are largely organised into existing ministerial 
structures and routines within the Norwegian central administration. These observations 
indicate that despite ten years of associated EU membership, domestic administrative routines 
and practices leave strong imprints on decision-making processes within the Norwegian 
central administration. 
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Figures and Tables  
Figure 1: Administrative sector-integration across levels of governance 
 
 Figure 2: Territorial integration across levels of governance 
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Table 1: Percent of EU regulations dealt with by the issue specific co-ordination 
committees of ME, MTI and MPE, by EU decision-making phase. 
 
Responsible ministry: 
Preparation 
phase 
Decision-shaping 
phase 
Decision-making 
phase 
Total 
ME (215 dossiers) 
MTI (269 dossiers) 
MPE (51 dossiers) 
14 % 
7 % 
16 % 
49 % 
19 % 
45 % 
36 % 
74 % 
39 % 
100 % 
100 % 
100 % 
SUM (535 dossiers) 11 % 34 % 56 % 100 % 
Source: Audit General of Norway 2005, 28 
 
Table 2: Percent of ‘problem-notes’ written by ME, MTI and MPE, by EU decision-
making phase. 
 
Responsible ministry: 
Preparation 
phase 
Decision-shaping 
phase 
Decision-making 
phase 
Total 
ME (112 problem-notes) 
MTI (227 problem-notes) 
MPE (17 problem-notes) 
13 % 
1 % 
6 % 
40 % 
26 % 
59 % 
46 % 
73 % 
35 % 
100 % 
100 % 
100 % 
SUM (356 problem-notes) 5 % 32 % 63 % 100 % 
Source: Audit General of Norway 2005, 31 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This paper is financially supported by the Audit General of Norway and the Joint Committee of the Nordic 
Social Science Research Councils. The author is indebted to Torbjörn Larsson for stimulating discussions and 
comments. A slightly different version of this article was presented at the Norwegian conference in political 
science, Oslo, 2005. The author is indebted to the participants at this conference for valuable comments. 
2 When analysing transformations of organisational modus operandi one is plagued with problems of empirical 
operationalisation, validations of causation as well as problems of assessment (Knill & Lenschow 2001). To 
begin with, it is not always clear what has changed and whether these changes should be considered fundamental 
or marginal. In many cases, although the government leadership officially claims that radical organisational 
overhauls have been accomplished, the changes may be merely cosmetic in practice (Brunsson 1989). At the 
other extreme, one may observe that organisations change drastically – not by re-organising the formal apparatus 
but by changing the decision-making processes unfolding within the established structures (Olsen 2003a). 
Organisational change may happen without formal approval or sanctioning by the leadership (March 1994). A 
growing body of literature on the Europeanisation of public administration demonstrates that domestic politico-
administrative systems are mainly preserved and adapt path-dependently towards EU institutions (e.g. Engel 
2003; Kassim, Peters & Wright 2000; Wessels, Maurer & Mittag 2003). Upon closer inspection domestic public 
administrative bodies are transformed incrementally through minor adjustments of decision-making dynamics 
(Olsen 2003b).  
3 Except the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.  
4 Moreover, the relative co-ordination power of the Norwegian PMO with regard to domestic EU/EEA decision-
making processes seems to correlate with the political party in office. For example, whereas Prime Minister 
Brundtland from the Labour party “was personally strongly committed to EU membership and made it a central 
part of her political agenda for the 1990s” (Narud & Strøm 2000, 141), the current Prime Minister Bondevik 
from the Christian Democratic party is a reluctant European and officially against Norwegian membership in the 
EU.  
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